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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
LORAINE J. WHITE 
Plaintiff a'Yld Respondent 
vs. 
NATIONAL POSTAL TRANSPORT 
ASSOCIATION, formerly RAIL-
WAY MAIL ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant and .App,ellant. 
Case No. 7829 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent believes that a detailed statement of 
facts in this case will be of benefit to the C:ourt because 
the questions of law presented on this appeal must be 
determined from the factual picture presented. It should 
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2 
be noted that the references to the record which follow 
throughout this brief are to the ·pages numbered in red 
by the Clerk of Court, and have no reference to the 
typewritten page numbers on the transcript of testi-
mony prepared by the Court Reporter, which latter 
numbers are apparently referred to by appellant in 
its brief. 
There was ~vidence in this case from which the 
jury could find the following facts: Milton J. White, 
prior to his death, was the holder of a certificate of 
insurance issued by the appellant association. The cer-
tificate, Exhibit ''A,'' contains an in'suring clause which 
provides that the appellant would pay certain disability 
benefits if the holder of the certificate ·should receive 
bodily injuries through ''external, violent and acci-
dental means" and paragraph 4 of the insuring clause 
·p~rovides that if "death shall result from such injuries 
alone within one year from the date of injury," the 
appellant would pay to the beneficiary, who is respond-
ent herein, the sum of $4,000.00. 
Following the insuring paragraphs, there may be 
found the exclusion paragraph, in which the term '' acci-
dental death'' .is defined and in which the statement is 
made that the appellant should not be liable when "dis-
ease, defect or bodily infirmity is a contributing cause 
of death. Accidental death is said to be ''either sudden, 
violent death ·from external violent and accidental 
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means, resulting directly, independently and exclusively 
of any other causes . . . ; or death within one year, as 
the sole result of accidental means alone." 
Milton J. White died February 14, 1950, approxi-
mately 5¥2 months after having suffered an injury to 
his right leg (R. 51). Respondent filed her claim with 
appellant for death benefits, which claim was denied. 
This action followed. The record is silent as to whether 
appellant denie·d the claim because it believed respond-
ent had not brought herself within the insuring clause, 
or because it believed respondent's elaim was prohibited 
under the exclusion clause. On trial, appellant claimed 
that the death was not the result, ''directly, independ-
ently and exclusively'' of the injury to the leg, but 
that a heart "disease" and Buerger's disease were, 
at least, contributing causes of ·death. 
At the time of his death, White was a man 5 feet 
11 inches tall, weighed about 155 pounds, and was age 
63. When he was a child, he had apparently suffered 
from rheumatic fever. In his high school and college 
days, he had been extremely active physically, partici-
pating in the strenuous sports of track and basketball 
(R. 35). In ·his adult life, his hobbies were hunting and 
fishing. He was an "outdoor man" and was "very 
active.'' He ·had gone on a hunting trip iri the fall ~f 
the year prior to the accident (R. 36). He was employed 
at the railroad yards in Ogden and his work consisted 
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4. 
o.f .going about .. the yards, from train to train, and 
arr~nging for space in mail cars (R. 34, 35). He had 
had such work since about 1919 (R. 35) The certificate 
of insurance, Exhibit "A," was issued July 8, 1924, 
and had been maintained by White for 25~ years prior 
to his death. 
White had consulted Dr. Goddard in November, 
1948 at which time Dr. Goddard believed that he had 
suffered a'' splenic infarct,'' or an embolus which struck 
the spleen, from which he recovered without incident. 
Thereafter, Dr. Goddard treated White with drugs 
designed to assist the heart to compensate for the 
damage which had been done to it by the -childhood 
affliction. of rheumatic fever. Dr. Goddard des~cribed 
the condition for . which White was being treated as 
"congestive heart failure" (R. 99), which is a condition 
wherein the heart is a· ''damaged heart,'' one which 
is ''no longer able to handle its load." This is a condition 
which ·can be controlled, and there is no reason to be-
lieve death will occur suddenly-sudden death is '·'less 
apt to occur." (R. 106) TP.e condition was under con-
trol. Dr. Olson, the sp·ecialist, said that when he first 
saw . the patient, which was after the accident, the 
patient ''didn't have symptoms, signs of active inflam-
·mation in tlie heart" (R. 71) (italics added). Dr. Olson 
'stated on the death certificate, Exhibit 2, that the 
. a· , '. t· " rheumatic heart · 1sease was 1nac 1ve. 
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The injury to the leg occurred August 28, 1949, ·at 
Dodge City, Kansas, 'vhen son1e men, standing behind 
the deceased, jerked a wooden -bench so that the corner 
of the bench struck the calf of \V.hite 's right leg a force-
ful blow (R. 39). The next day, there was a bruise on 
the leg, about 2 inches long and one inch wide, running 
across the leg (R. 40). \Vhite was in great pain then 
and thereafter (R. 41). Prior to the injury, he had never 
made any complaint about pain in any part of his body 
(R. 41). He complained of pain to such an extent after 
the injury that he and his wife cut short their vacation 
and started back to Ogden, arriving about September 
3, 1949. During the trip home, White found it necessary 
to sit on the back seat of the car, with his leg extended 
along the seat (R. 41). He arrived home, took a bath, 
went to bed -and Dr. Goddard was called. He hospitalized 
the patient at once and stated that White was in con-
gestive heart failure at that time. 
By the time White was p~laced in the hospital, the 
leg was showing definite signs of -getting worse. The 
"little blood vessels ... were breaking. It was like a 
spider web, ·discolored under the skin'' ( R. 42). The 
area involved was now all over the lower leg, and on the 
foot (R. 42.). The doctors felt there was an imp,air-
ment of circulation and decided to operate in an effort 
to locate the point of circulation stoppage and remove 
the clot or other impairment. An embolectomy was ·p,er-
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formed on or about Septe1nber 8, 1949, but it did no 
good (R. 70). Nine days later, White was taken home. 
The leg continued to get worse, and by late October, it 
was shiny black, like "patent leather" and the toes on 
the foot were "curled right up-dead" (R. 44, 45). On 
O·ctober 27, 1949, the leg was amputated at a point 5 em. 
above the knee (Ex. 5) and a ~pathological examination 
reveale·d that the vessels of the leg were afflicted with 
''obliterating thrombo-angiitis,'' which is Buerger's 
disease. (R. 105). Following the amputation, White 
was taken home and thereafter became steadily weaker 
and was bed-ridden until the time of his death (R. 46). 
With reference to Buerger's disease, Dr. Olson testi-
fied that it is "probably correct" that trauma or injury 
''often serves as a starting point of the gangrenous 
lesion,'' as stated by a recognized medical authority in 
discussing gangrene (R. 78). There was no evidence 
of the presence of Buerger's disease prior to the time 
Dr. Olson was called on the case (R. 45). The record 
reveals nothing from which it might be said that the 
disease was present ·and if it was present, it was latent 
and unknown. The doctors were not treating him for 
Buerger's disease ( R. 79). 
The shock from the two operations, the subsequent 
bed rest, the nausea, violent retching and vomiting, were 
said to be sufficient to act upon White's previous con-
dition so as to "move it into being, or move it into life 
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again'' and these circumstances also were sufficient 
to aid in loosening a clot of blood in the system. ( R. 71, 
72). An embolus is a portion of a clot, in medical p~ar-
lance. 
The three doctors who testified apparently were all 
of the opinion that an embolism had occurred in the 
body of White just prior to his death February 14, 1950. 
Dr. Olson said it was, in his judgment, more likely a 
cerebral embolism, but admitted it was. ''quite possible'' 
it could have been a pulmonary embolism (R. 82). Dr. 
Peltzer said that, statistically, a ·cerebral embolus was 
most likely (R. 113, 114). Dr. Goddard refused to state 
what the exact cause of death was since ·he was not 
present at the time, and had been off the case for 
several weeks prior to death. However, he stated the 
leg injury "necessarily" had a causal ·connection with 
death ( R. 101). 
The diagnosis in the ·death ·certificate, Exhihit 2, of 
''cerebral embolism'' or ''embolus in the brain'' was not 
conclusive, in the absence of an autopsy (R. 115), and 
the term ''cerebral embolism'' shows where the embolus 
ultimately came to rest, not the point from which it 
started (R. 96). The cause of death could have been 
a "pulmonary embolism" or embolus in the lung (R. 82), 
but even if the embolus had gone to the brain, it could 
have originated either in the heart or in the leg. It might 
have originated in the leg because of the fact that there 
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is "a likelihood of thrombus forming at the site of an 
operation" (R. 94). In Dr. ·Olson's opinion, if the em-
bolus had come from the leg it would have been an ''un-
common'' situation, but it nevertheless could have hap-
pened if the patient had had an abnormal opening in 
the ''two chambers'' of the heart ( R. 94). There is no 
way to tell whether this patient had such an abnormal 
opening without an autopsy. Such an embolism going 
from the leg to the brain is called a ''paradoxical em-
bolism.'' If that occurred in this case, according to Dr. 
Olson, the events that made surgery necessary "had a 
casual connection with the production of thrombus, 
the patient's embolus, and death" (R. 95). The doctors 
were all in agreement that an injury of the kind suffered 
by Mr. White is more or less severe and se.rious, de-
pending upon the condition of the person upon whom 
the injury is inflicted and depending upon whether that 
person has within his system conditions or diseases, 
known or unknown, upon which such an injury can act 
or which can be activated by such an injury. 
In summarization of the medical evidence which 
was before the jury, it may be said that all the doctors 
agreed that an embolus was present in this case, but 
none of the doctors was certain as to its origin, its route 
of travel, or its final resting place, although they believed 
it more likely that it ·came to rest in the brain. The 
doctors were in disagreement as to the condition of the 
patient prior to the injuryr. Dr. Peltzer described his 
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condition as ''a serious cardiac disease,'' while Dr. 
Goddard said the condition was ''under control'' with 
death unlikely, and Dr. Olson said that there were no 
symptoms or signs of "active inflammation" and that 
the rheumatic heart condition was "inactive" (Exhibit 
2). Dr. Peltzer's testimony, of course, was hypothetical 
since he had never seen the patient, while the other 
doctors had each been in attendance upon the patient 
before the injury and afterward. 
From this ·state of facts, the jury was required to 
answer at least the following questions: 
1. Was the heart condition of Milton White a 
condition which was not active prior to the injury~ 
2. If his condition was inactive prior to injury, 
did the injury reactivate it and create conditions which 
led directly to his death Y 
3. Were the conditions of Buerger's disease and a 
damaged heart from rheumatic fever in childhood con-
tributing causes to White's death within the meaning of 
that term as defined by the Court '-s instruction No. 6 ¥ 
The jury apparently answered the first two of these 
questions in the affirmative and the third in the negative, 
because it returned a verdict for the p~laintiff, against 
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the defendant, in the amount of the insurance certificate 
involved, and 'from the judgment entered upon this 
verdict,. this appeal is prosecuted. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
1. THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO BE CON-
SIDERED BY THE JURY ON ALL ISSUES IN THIS 
CASE, AND HENCE THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY. 
2. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
8 AND 9, SINCE THEY REFLECT RESPONDENT'S 
"THEORY OF THE CASE". 
ARGUMENT 
1. THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO BE CON-
SIDERED BY THE JURY ·ON ALL ISSUES IN THIS 
CASE, AND HENCE THE COURT DID N·OT ERR IN 
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY. 
The respondent approached this case upon the 
theory that since the cause of death could not be deter-
mined with certainty in the absence of an autopsy, it 
would be necessary to bring before the trial court and 
jury all available factual evidence concerning the physi-
cal condition of ·Milton White in the last months of 
his life, in order that the jury would be able to weigh 
the medical evidence in the light of the objective facts 
and thus arrive at a fair determination of the ultimate 
truth of the matter. This is not a case wher·e medical 
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evidence alone can furnish the answers to the problems 
presented, since the doctors \Yho testified w,ere unable 
to avoid the admission that death could have occurred in 
several different ways. All \Yere agreed that death re-
sulted from an embolus, but all recognized that the basic 
facts about the origin, ro-q_te and destination of the 
embolus in White's body were, and must be, unknown. 
Respondent therefore presented evidence from which 
the jury could find either that the injury to White 
reactivated or "lighted up" an inactive heart condi-
tion, which led to his death, or that the injury started 
an unbroken chain of circumstances which led to his 
death, independently of any contributing cause. An 
examination of the record will reveal evidence to sup-
port each theory, and that appellant should be ·held 
liable upon either of these theories. Cer-tainly, the rec-
ord reveals sufficient evidence to require submission 
of the case to the jury, as will be demonstrated in the 
succeeding argument. 
First, there can be no doubt that there was a 
violent, painful injury to the leg of Milton White, and 
that the injury resulted from external, violent and acci-
dental means. While the injury was not substantial, 
compared with some injuries, there is little ·doubt that 
it was painful, since the record is uncontradicted that 
Mr. and Mrs. White cut short their vacation trip, and 
returned from Kansas to Ogden, because of the pain 
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and discomfort being suffered by Mr. White. During 
the trip home, he was required to keep the leg elevated 
on the seat of the car. The day after the injury, a 
bruise developed at the site of the bump. The bruise 
was two inches in length and one inch wide, with the 
length extending horizontally across the calf of the leg. 
Six days following the injury, it was apparent even 
to non-medical eyes that there was more to the injury 
than a mere bruise. A ·circulatory disturbance was begin-
ning to manifest itself. The veins were beginning to 
"break up" and they gave a "spider web" appearance. 
Both doctors in attendance, Dr. Goddard and Dr. Ol-
son, knew that a circulatory impairment was present 
and about 11 or 12 days after the injury, an 01peration, 
known as embolectomy, was performed to try to cor-
rect the situation. The operation was unsuccessful and 
there followed a period of seven weeks in which the 
leg became steadily worse. It began to turn black. It 
was hard. The toes were curled. up. The pain was 
constant and severe and finally, on October 27, 1949, 
it became necessary to amputate the leg. The amputa-
tion was accomplished in a five-hour operation, and the 
leg was removed at a point about 5 centimeters above 
the knee. 
A p-athological examination was made after ampu-
tation and it was noted that there was definite evidence 
of Buerger's disease, and that the leg contained black, 
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silk-like fibers, such as suture material (Ex. 5 ). There 
was no explanation of how this material got in the leg, 
or ho\Y it got ''meshed around the artery'', as stated in 
the exhibit, but it is reasonable to assume that it came 
from the embolecton1y 7 weeks earlier. There was no 
indication from the examination of how long Buerger's 
disease had been in the leg, or whether the disease was 
advanced. The record is silent on the question, except that 
there is no suggestion in the evidence that the Buerger's 
disease was present prior to the injury. There had never 
been any indication of any kind of trouble in White's leg, 
and it is reasonable to suppose that had there been such 
trouble, it would have been known, either to White's 
wife, or to the doctor who examined him v~rior to his 
trip. Since the disease affects the circulatory system, 
and since White's work required him to be on his feet, 
in and about the railroad yards, there is little doubt that 
had he had the disease before the injury, he would 
have been aware of it. 
These are permissible inferences to be drawn from 
the record on the question of Buerger's disease, and 
when they are coupled with the statement by Dr. Olson 
that it is "probably correct" that trauma to the tissues 
is often the starting point of the gangrenous lesion, 
it is clear that there was evidence to go to the jury on 
the question of whether or not the injury to the leg 
had a causal relation to the operations of embolectomy 
and amputation. 
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The record next reveals that following the ampu-
tation, in fact, in the weeks immediately preceding it, 
White's condition became steadily worse. He became 
steadily weaker. He was nauseated. His body was 
wracked with spasms of violent retching. He lost weight. 
Dr. Goddard testified that the amputation would be 
"quite a strain on the man" (R. 101). There is shock 
from such operations. Bed rest can have an adverse 
effect. All of these conditions were said to be suffi-
cient, in the opinion of Dr. Olson, to act upon White's 
previous condition so as to "move it into life again'' 
or "move it into being". (R. 71, 72) These circum-
stances were sufficient to aid in loosening a clot of 
blood in the system (R. 72). An embolus is a portion 
of a clot, in medical parlance. 
It was agreed by all the doctors that an embolus, 
traveling in the blood stream, lodged in a vital area, 
occluding the passage of blood, resulting in death. This 
is known as an ''embolism''. That an embolism resulted 
in death ap,pears to be conceded. Indeed, no other cause 
of death was suggested by any doctor. 
Up to this point, the evidence is clear, objective 
and largely factual. The speculation among the doctors 
begins at this point in the record, and it concerns itself 
with the source of the embolus that caused death, its 
route of travel, and its lethal lodging place. The jury 
necessarily was required to examine the possibilities 
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advanced by the doctors and to fit those possibilities to 
the objective and factual evidence already before them. 
It is here, then, that the t\YO theories, mentioned at the 
beginning of the argun1ent on this point, enter the case. 
The first theory is that the injury, with the result-
ing conditions already discussed, reactiva~e~ or ''lighted 
up" an inactive heart condition, causing death. But, 
appellant says there was no evidence that the heart 
conditon was previously inactive, prior to the injury. 
The record is to the contrary. Dr. Goddard described 
White's condition, and he is the only doctor in the 
record who ever saw White before the injury. He said 
the heart was ''damaged'' from a childhood disease, 
but that the condition was under control. Dr. Olson 
said that when he first saw the patient, on September 
3, 1949, after the injury, there were ''no symptoms, signs 
of active inflammation in the heart'' and there was '' evi-
dence of heart damage caused by a previous rheumatic 
condition". (R. 84) (emphasis supplied). Thus, it is 
clear that at the time of Dr. Olson's first examination, 
the heart condition had not yet been reactivated. Dr. 
Olson also testified that ''rheumatic heart disease, where 
there is no active inflammation, does not produce pain'' 
(R. 88) and it is clear, from the record, that White ·had 
no pain in the chest, but only in the leg. Finally, Dr. 
Olson stated on the death certificate, Exhibit 2, that 
the rheumatic heart disease was "inactive". These are 
all competent statements, made by competent witnesses, 
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in plain language, and the jury was entitled to believe 
them. If the jury did believe them, it had substantial 
evidence upon which to base its finding that the heart 
condition was inactive, prior to injury. While there was 
evidence that White had a ''clinically diagnosed'' embolic 
episode in the fall of 1948, the jury was entitled to 
believe, from the evidence of res·pondent and Dr. God-
dard, tha.t there was no further activity of the heart 
condition from that time until the month of September, 
1949, nearly one year later. 
If, then, there was substantial evidence upon which 
to find that the heart ·condition was formerly inactive, 
there was equally substantial evidence that the injury 
led to the gangrenous condition of the leg, which led to 
the operations, and then, to the complications following 
amputation, and, as Dr. Olson stated, these conditions 
were sufficient to "move into being" or "move into 
life again'' the previous condition. Since Dr. Olson and 
Dr. Peltzer both stated that the active disease manifests 
itself by irregular beating, or "fibrillation", and that 
such beating allows clots to form, it is at once -clear 
that if the inactive heart disease was reactivated, as 
the jury ·could well find, one of the things to be expected 
would be the formation of blood clots, from which, as 
Dr. Peltzer stated, emboli are thrown off (R. 111). 
This, then, com'Pletes the evidence upon which the 
jury could find appellant liable upon its policy on the 
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first of the theories previously mentioned. This theory 
is that ,,~ hich is discussed and approved in the case of 
Lee v. ~7ew York L·ife Ins'lt.rance Cou~pany, 95 Utah 445, 
82 Pacific 2nd 178. \Y.hile there are factual differences 
between that case and this, the principles are the same, 
and the evidence presented is just as substantial as that 
discussed in the report of the Lee case, particularly 
when such evidence is viewed in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, as the court must do in determining 
'vhether to grant a motion by the defendant for a directed 
verdict. In the Lee case, the facts were as follows : 
Lee suffered an mJury to his body, on the lower 
right side of his trunk. There was no mark on the 
body, but there was pain. It was not until a month after 
the accident, during which time Lee could "walk about 
and leave the house", that an examination was made, 
and it was determined that there was an acute inflam-
mation active in Lee's system. An operation was per-
formed, resulting in the location and removal of his 
appendix. Exploring further, the surgeon found a rup-
tured gall bladder and the doctor testified that the gall 
bladder was infected and was the sole ·cause of death. 
The chain of causation utilized in the Lee case was that 
the blow to the body ruptured the gall bladder, which 
caused infection to spread, which infection attacked the 
appendix, which made necessary the operation, leading 
to death. This Court, in upholding a verdict for plain-
tiff, said: "If "Dr. Pearce be believed, and the jury 
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had a right to believe him, the diseased condition of 
the gall bladder was not actively progressing and it 
afforded no reason to believe that death might be immi-
nent." In the case at bar, both Doctor Olson and Doctor 
Goddard gave evidence, previously outlined, that White's 
heart condition was not actively progressing and there 
was no reason to believe death might be imminent. It 
is clear that this case and the Lee case are the same 
in principle. 
Appellant urges, however, that the Lee case does 
not apply and that this case is controlled by the case of 
Tucker vs. New York Life Inswra;nce Com;,pany, 107 Utah 
478, 155 Pacific 2d 173. This ·claim is made because in 
the Tucker case the court denied liability upon the 
theory that the ' 'chronic and progressing'' disease co-
operated with the broken arm to produce death. That 
there are basic differences in fact and principle between 
the Tucker case and the instant case is so obvious that 
it scarcely requires discussion. There is no evidence in 
this case from which the jury could find the existence 
of a "chronic and progressing" condition. In the Tucker 
case the doctors testified that ''atherosclerosis changes" 
had been present in the patient for more than a year 
with "increased blood pressure during that period", 
and further testified that "it is a chronic condition and 
slowly advancing'' (emphasis supplied). Another differ· 
ence in the cases is that in the Tucker case there was 
an autopsy and the pathologist was able to determine 
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the exact nature of death. The doctors were in agree-
ment on all major causal factors. In the instant case, 
however, the doctors \Yere reduced to giving opinions 
\vhich were not certain, and \Yere required to admit in 
all honesty that there were many possibilities which 
could have resulted in the death. 
In the case at bar there is no evidence that Milton 
White's damaged heart \Yas becoming worse in the 
period leading up to the accident, and in no sense can 
it be said that his condition was ''chronic and slowly 
advancing" as \\~as true of the victim in the Tucker 
case. Even after the injury, Dr. Olson testified that 
there was no active inflammation noted by him in the 
patient's heart, and there is an obvious difference, 
therefore, between the condition of White at that time 
and the condition of Nichols in the Tucker case. While 
it is true that the doctors in the instant case were required 
to reduce their testimony to opinions based upon judg-
ment and to probabilities or possibilities, the jury was 
entitled to believe that portion of the doctors' testimony 
which would lend support to the plaintiff's case. 
The second theory mentioned at the ·beginning of 
this argument was that the injury started an unbroken 
chain of circumstances leading to Milton White's ·death, 
independently of any contributing cause. As has been 
indicated, it was conceded that death was caused by 
an embolism. There was ample evidence from which 
the jury could find that the accidental injury led to the 
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gangrenous condition of the leg, which in turn made 
necessary the embolectomy and the amputation. Like. 
wise, there was ample evidence that the amputation, 
with its resultant shock arid because of the fact that an 
amputation enables blood clots to form, could have 
caused the formation of a blood clot, and the complica-
tions following the operation could have caused the clot 
to break up or loosen so that an embolus could be re-
leased into the blood stream. 
·On this theory of the case there is little difference, 
except as to the weight of evidence, whether or not 
the embolus lodged in the brain or in the lung. Much 
was made upon trial of the fact that the embolus was 
more likely to have lodged in the brain and that such an 
occurrence was more likely to have occurred from an 
embolus coming from the heart. However, the evide~ce 
indicated other possibilities as we will show. 
In support of this second theory of the plaintiff, 
it may be said that there was evidence from which the 
jury could find that the embolism which caused death 
was a pulmonary embolism. Dr. Olson so testified. He 
also testified that blood clots very often form at the 
situs of an operation such as the amputation. If the 
lethal embolus was a piece of such a blood clot, it would 
require no unusual condition for it to travel in the 
system to the lung and cause death. Such an occurrence 
is, to quote Dr. Olson. "Quite possible" (R. 82), and to 
quote Dr. Peltzer, "Quite likely" (R. 115). 
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If, however, the jury chose to believe that the em-
bolism occurred in the brain, there \Yas still evidence 
from which the jury n1ight have found that such a cere-
bral embolisn1, nevertheless, could have originated in 
the leg. HaYing in mind that blood clots form at the 
point of operation, it will be remembered that Dr. 
Olson testified· that an embolus can reach the brain if 
there .is an abnormal opening in the chambers of the 
heart. Such an embolism is called a ''paradoxical embol-
ism'' and is, in the words of Dr. Olson, ''uncommon'' 
and, according to Dr. Peltzer, "rare". However, since 
no autopsy 'vas performed, Dr. Olson stated that there 
is no way to tell "\Yhether Milton White had such an 
abnormal opening, and therefore no way to tell if this was 
in fact a paradoxical embolism. He would not rule out 
the possibility, despite counsel's attempt (R. 92) to get 
him.to say that it was an impossibility. 
From all of the foregoing argument, it is ·clear that 
the plaintiff had met the requirements of proving her 
case, and even if it be admitted, for the sake of argu-
ment, that some of the testimony produced upon plain-
tiff's case was not of as great weight as might be desired, 
it is obvious, nevertheless, that substantial evidence was 
produced to go to the .jury on each of the theories men-
tioned. In determining whether or not the Trial Court 
should have granted a motion for directed verdict, it 
must be remembered that the evidence of the plaintiff is 
to be tested in the light most' favorable to the plaintiff, 
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and when that test is applied, there can be no doubt 
that plaintiff met and satisfied her burden of proof. 
Appellant seems to complain that some of plaintiff's 
evidence was speculative in nature. It is submitted 
' however, that the testimony of the doctors in this case 
has considerably more strength and weight than the 
testimony upheld by this Court in the case of Cla;yton 
vs. Metropolita;n Life lns'Uiflwnce Compam;y, 96 Utah 331, 
85 Pacific 2d 819, wherein plaintiff's case was upheld 
upon testimony by a physician that he thought that 
the condition of the deceased "might''' have been caused 
by the injury sustained by the deceased (emphasis 
added). 
In summary, it may be said that the first theory 
discussed is the theory of the Lee ·case, supra, and that 
if the jury decided to follow the second theory, that is 
the theory discussed .and advanced in the case of 
Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94 
Utah 532, 72 Pacific 2d 1060, in which these cases are 
divided into categories, and in which it is stated that 
the insurer will he liable where the insured is afflicted 
with a condition at the time of the accident, but the 
condition had no causal connection with the injury or 
death and the injury started an unb-roken chain of 
circumstances resulting in death without the interven-
tion of any other cause. 
We therefore submit that the Court did not err in 
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overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict 
and allo"'i.ng this case to be considered by the jury. 
2. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
8 AND 9, SINCE THEY REFLECT RESPONDENT'S 
"THEORY OF THE CASE". 
The principles of law applicable in a discussion 
of Point 2 in this brief have been discussed many times 
by this Court in reviewing law cases where complaint 
has been made concerning instructions that were given 
or refused by the Trial Court. 
It is a well known p~rinciple ·of law that each party 
to a law suit is entitled to have his theory of the case 
submitted to the jury, if there is evidence to support 
that theory. As was said by this Court in the case of 
Hartley vs. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 Pacific .522, 
''There are two parties to a law suit. Each, on a sub-
mission of the case to the jury, is entitled to a sub-
mission of it on his theory and the law in respect 
thereof.'' 
In Toone vs. O"Neill Construction Company, 40 
Utah 2'65, 121 Pacific 10, complaint was made of an 
instruction given by the Trial Court which was claimed 
to be too broad in view of the evidence. The · Court 
stated '' ... we concede that a party is entitled to have 
his case submitted to the jury upon the theory of his 
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evidence as well as upon the theories of the whole evi-
dence. One way the Court might have followed in 
charging the jury would have been to charge them in 
separate instructions, first, in aecordance with respond-
ent's evidence; and, second, in accordance with appel-
lant's evidence . . . and in each instruction to have 
directed the jury to return a verdict in accordance with 
the findings upon that question." 
While these cases are not new, they are considered 
to be leading cases and have been repeatedly referred to 
by the Court in recent years. See Webb vs. Snow, 132 
Pacific 2d 114, and Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 
132 Pacific 2d 114. In Morrison vs. Perry, this Court 
quotes with approval the suggestion contained in Toone 
vs. O'Neill, supra. 
Applying these principles to the instructions in 
this case, it is at once apparent that the appellant's 
theory was presented to the jury in Instruction No. 6, 
and had the jury found the facts necessary to support 
that instruction, the appellant no doubt would have 
recovered a verdict. The respondent's theories were 
presented in Instructions Nos. 8 and 9. 
Instruction No. 8 is the instruction which says, in 
substance, that the mere fact that Milton H. White had 
ailments or infirmities of the body which deprived him 
of normal powers of resistance would not preclude a 
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recovery by his widow if the jury should find that the 
claimed injury \Yas a real, direct and efficient cause. of 
his death. The language used reflects the theory dis-
cussed by this Court in the case of Griffin vs. Prudential 
Ins~trance Cou~;pany, 102 Utah 363, 133 Pacific 2d 333. In-
struction No. 8, in fact, is almost identical with the 
instruction approved in the Griffin case. 
It is conceded that the Griffin case is not on all 
fours with this case and that the facts were 'substan-
tially different. However, the principle of ~aw therein 
announced, and which had previously been announced 
by this Court in the Browning case, is a proper· prin-
ciple to be applied to this case. In the Browning case 
this Court remarked that all people probably have, in 
their systems microbes, germs and bacteria of many 
diseases. The Court then went on to say "because .. in 
warding off such possible diseases we may be in · -~ 
weakened condition of strength and resistance, we m_ay 
the more readily succumb to an injury accidentally 
sustained by external violence. The injury, in the pres-
ence of the disease germs in the system, would· still be 
the cause of death or disability·." 
Any construction of an insurance policy whereby 
the insurance company would -be relieved of liability 
because of some condition or departure from normal, 
would reduce insurance contracts to an absurdity. If 
such a construction . were followed, as urged by the 
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appellant, no person holding an accident insurance policy 
could be sure of protection and coverage for himself, 
because many of us are afflicted with damaged organs 
or impaire·d bodily functions of which we are not aware. 
TYJp,ical of the attitude taken by modern courts on 
this question is that found in the case of Kearney vs. 
Washington National Insurance Company, 52 Pacific 2d 
903, decided by the Supreme Court of Washington. In 
that case there was evidence which indicated that the 
insured had a con<lition of arthritis and :arteriosclerosis. 
He suffered a fall, and the next day was blind in one 
eye. There was evidence that the arteriosclerosis had 
affected the left eye. The Washington Supreme Court, 
in upholding a verdict for the insured, quoted with 
approval from the Michigan Supreme Court in the case 
of Kangas vs. New York Life Insurance Company, 223 
Michigan 238, 193 N.W. 867, wherein the Court stated 
' 'In most cases a policy of this character would be of 
little or no value to the insured if the limiting language 
be literally interpreted, as claimed by the defendant. 
Death from an external injury, unless instantaneous, is 
usually the result of various concurring causes. The 
injury sets in motion other agencies and awakens 
dormant internal ailments which contribute to death. 
These are conditions rather than causes. If such 
insurance contracts are to be of any value to the man 
who pays for the risk assumed, a construction as fair 
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and reasonable as the limiting language will permit 
should be placed upon them.'' 
Appellant's argument concerning Instruction No. 9 
is, in substance, that the instruction sets forth the doc-
trine of the Lee case but that there is no evidence to 
support such a doctrine in this case. It is submitted 
that that contention has already been answered in . the 
first portion of respondent's argument, and that an 
examination of the record will reveal evidence to sup-
port each step necessary to bring the Lee case to bear 
upon this case. 
Appellant also says that the instruction · '~opened 
the door to sheer speculation, bias, and prejudice.'' 
Nowhere in the record have we been able to find any 
hint of bias or prejudice. There is, of course, specul~ .... 
tion in the record because the doctors all admitted. that 
there were various possibilities for the source, rout~, 
and destinati9n of the embolus which caused death. As 
has been demonstrated, however, respondent should be 
entitled to recover upon either of two theories, both of 
which find support in the possibilities advanced by the 
doctors. 
When closely analyzed, aprp~ellant's contention· is 
merely a quarrel with the weight of the evidence. The 
question of the weight of the evidence and the cr~di-
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bility of the witnesses was for the jury, and only for 
the jury. 
Where the jury has brought before it a case com-
p.osed of objective fact, considered medical opinion, and 
speculative medical opinion, there is little doubt that 
the jury's task is much more difficult to perform, but 
this situation occurs in almost every case where medical 
testimony is given concerning human ailments. Medi-
cine is not an exact science, Anderson vs. Nixon, 104 
Utah 262, 139 Pacific 2nd, 216, and where the doctors 
testify as to two possibilities, the jury should be free 
to accept that possibility which, to their minds, most 
nearly fits the objective, known and uncontradicted facts 
before them. 
Applying that principle to this case, it is difficult 
to see how the jury could have held other than it did 
when it is remembered that prior to the injury Milton 
White was in no danger of imminent death and was, in 
fact, actively engaged on a job requiring full use of 
his physical faculties. 5~ months. later he was dead, 
after having lost the greater portion of his leg, and 
after having been reduced to a comparative shell -of his 
former self. Those are admitted facts and could not 
be contradicted in the eyes of the jury. It is, therefore, 
logical, natural and pro~per that the jury, having those 
facts in mind, should choose to believe whatever medical ... 
evidence was before them which would tend to give a j ' ' • ', ', \' 
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reason for the infirmities and death of Milton· White. 
The jury 'vas not required to believe the appellant's 
,vitness, Dr. Peltzer, and particularly is this true when 
it is recalled that the jury 'vitnessed, throughout the trial, 
Dr. Peltzer in constant attendance upon ap·pellant 's 
counsel, suggesting questions to be asked, and generally 
taking the part of appellant's side of the case prior to 
the time he took the witness stand. Confronted by this 
situation, and realizing that Dr. Peltzer testified entirely 
upon the basis of facts told to him and not upon the 
basis of his actual experience with the patient, the. jury 
could hardly be expected to give as much weight and 
credibility to his testimony as· to the testimony of Dr. 
Goddard and Dr. Olson. 
One other point should be mentioned in connection 
with the instructions. It is a familiar princirp~le that 
instructions should be examined as a whole. When the 
Court's entire charge to the jury is examined in· this 
case, it seems abundantly clear that the jury was in-
structed so that the theories of both plaintiff and defend-
ant were adequately and properly brought before the 
jury. It must be presumed that the jury examined and 
heeded all of the instructions and did .not single out any 
particular instruction. When this presumption is con-
sidered, together with the substantial evidence which 
has been previously discussed, there can be no doubt 
that the court's instructions were free from error. 
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Therefore, we submit that the Court did not com-
mit error in giving its Instructions Nos. 8 and 9, and 
that these instructions merely presented plaintiff's 
''theory of the case'' and ·should, therefore, be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
Much of the speculation discussed by both parties 
to this law suit might have been avoided had the appel-
lant exercised its right to an autopsy on the body of 
Milton White. This right is given to the appellant by 
its by-laws and constitution (Ex. 6), and had an auto~psy 
been performed, it is likely that the doctors would have 
been able to be much more specific in their testimony. 
Inasmuch as the .autopsy was not performed, and inas-
much as respondent presented all available evidence 
bearing upon the issues in this case, and since there was 
substantial evidence which, if believed by the jury, 
would entitle· her to a verdict, it is submitted that the 
verdict and judgment were legally proper and morally 
just and should be affirmed by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. A. SKEEN and 
JOHN H. SN,OW 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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